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WILLIAM AL HIGINBOTHAM

RRNEST RKO LINDLEY

Headline

Serres

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450

Headline
Series

NUMBER 63
MAY-JUNE 1947

atomie

challenge

Splitting the Atom

WILLIAM A. HIGINBOTHAM page 3

Harnessing the Atom
ERNEST K. LINDLEY page 19

The Authors

WILLIAM A. HIGINBOTHAM: Executive secretary of the Federation
of American Scientists; wartime electronic physicist on radar at
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and on the atomic

bomb at Los Alamos.

ERNEST K. LINDLEY: Chief of Newsweek magazine’s Washington
bureau; political reporter and columnist, radio commentator,

author of several books on the Roosevelt era, observer at Bikini.

Cover design by Alvin Lustig

HEADLINE SERIES, NO. 63, MAY 20, 1947. PUBLISHED BIMONTHLY BY THE
FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, INCORPORATED, 22 EAST 38TH STREET, NEW
YORK 16, N. Y. THOMAS K. FORD, EDITOR; RITA BEHRMAN, ASSISTANT EDITOR.
SUBSCRIPTION RATES $2.00 FOR 6 ISSUES. SINGLE COPIES, 35¢. ENTERED AS
SECOND CLASS MATTER AUGUST 19, 1943, AT THE POST OFFICE AT NEW YORK,
N. Y., UNDER THE ACT OF MARCH 3, 1879. CopyrRiGHT, 1947, BY FOREIGN
POLICY ASSOCIATION, INCORPORATED. PRODUCED UNDER UNION CONDITIONS AND
COMPOSED, PRINTED, AND BOUND BY UNION LABOR. MANUFACTURED IN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Splitting
the Atom

WILLIAM A. HIGINBOTHAM

Atomic energy is always described in superlatives. Yet word de-
scriptions and pictures cannot begin to tell the awesome power of
an atomic explosion.

The sun and the stars have run on atomic power since time
began. In an indirect way we on earth live on atomic power too—
because the energy stored up in coal and gas and food came from
the sun. Now we are finding out how to make use of atomic power
at first hand. Already man has “improved” on nature, for the tem-
perature in an atomic explosion is greater than the temperature
at the center of the sun.

Your automobile is about one million times as powerful as a
Hy; atomic power is the same sort of improvement over gasoline.
A single bomb, containing a few pounds of atomic explosive,
destroyed a whole city in seconds. One bomb, one plane, one
crew replaced hundreds of planes and thousands of men. And
scientists warn that yet more powertul bombs are a frightening
possibility.

Facts like these are enough to make us stop and wonder if we
haven't started something that may destroy us, and the earth too.
The possibilities might seem to be almost limitless. Yet we know

3

there are limits. The Bikini tests did not cause tidal waves. There
is more power in an earthquake than in thousands of atomic
bombs, and the earth has survived any number of quakes. No in-
ventor is likely to make an atom bomb in his cellar, and there
is no danger of starting a chain reaction in the uranium in sea
water.

To understand the possibilities and limitations of this discovery,
we need a general grasp of what atomic energy is and how it can
be released. It takes years of advanced study to become a compe-
tent scientist, of course. But the basic ideas of atomic physics are
as easy to explain as the rules of a card game. The terminology is
no more complicated than that of pinochle.

Our description wil! be simplified and, from the scientific point
of view, incomplete; but it will be accurate as far as it goes.

THE ATOM

Long ago the alchemists recognized that all the materials familiar
to us—iron, air, water, and all the rest—are made up of a few
elements. Iron is one element sometimes found naturally in its
pure state. Air is a mixture of two elements, oxygen and nitrogen.
Water and most other substances we know are compounds of two
or more elements.

More than a century ago an Englishman, John Dalton, studied
the way elements combine to form compounds. He concluded
that they behave as if they were made up of tiny units which
he called “atoms.” Others carrying on his work have found that
there are 92 elements; that is, 92 different kinds of atoms.

Late in the nineteenth century another Englishman, J. J.
Thompson, proved that atoms are not indivisible. He discovered
that small electrically-charged particles could be knocked out of
any of them. These particles he named “electrons.”

But scientists still could not understand what an atom “looked
like.” The Curies in France provided the key when they dis-

4

MILESTONES TO ATOMIC ENERGY

400 B.C. GREEKS THOUGHT WORLD WAS
MADE OF BLOCKS—CALLED THEM ATOMS

1896 THOMPSON DISCOVERS THAT PARTI-
CLES CAN BE KNOCKED OUT OF ATOMS

1803 DALTON DISCOVERS ALL
ELEMENTS ARE MADE OF ATOMS

1905 EINSTEIN SUGGESTS
INTERCHANGEABILITY OF
MASS AND ENERGY

1911—12 RUTHERFORD AND BOHR
FORMULATE PLANETARY THEORY
OF ATOMS

1934 FERMI BOM-
BARDS URANIUM

YY)
\
1938—39 DISCOVERIES IN MANY

COUNTRIES THAT URANIUM GIVES
OFF GREAT ENERGY WHEN SPLIT

1932 CHADWICK
DISCOVERS NEUTRONS

1945 AUGUST.
HIROSHIMA BOMBRD

ae 1945 JULY. TEST
BOMB AT LOS ALAMOS,

1942 FIRST CHAIN REACTION PILE NEW MEX.
AT UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

GRAPHIC ASSOCIATES

covered that radium gives off particles that travel at a very high
speed and can be shot through atoms. Since these “bullets” may
pass through millions of atoms before they hit anything, it was
clear that the atom must be mostly space.

With this and other information at hand a scientist of still
another nationality, Niels Bohr, a Dane, was able to give us in
1912 the picture of the atom that is used today. It is like a minia-
ture solar system. Most of the weight is concentrated in the cen-
tral particle or “nucleus” which may be compared to the sun. In
the space around it, somewhat like planets, spin the electrons.
The electrons are held in their orbits by electrical attraction. Each
electron has one unit of charge of negative electricity. The nu-
cleus has units of positive charge equal to the number of electrons
around it.

Recent research has shown that the nucleus is itself made up
of still smaller particles of two kinds. One kind is the “proton”
which has one unit of positive charge. The other is the “neutron’
which has no electrical charge. The two have nearly equal
weights.

The simplest and lightest atom is that of hydrogen, with a nu-
cleus of one proton and a single electron revolving around. it.
Its “atomic number” is 1 and its “atomic weight” is also 1. Next
comes helium, whose atomic number is 2. The helium atom has 2
electrons in its outer space and therefore 2 protons in its nucleus.
But it also has 2 neutrons in its nucleus. Since neutrons and pro-
tons have the same weight and electrons weigh hardly anything.
the “atomic weight” of helium is 4.

Going on up the scale, we finally come to the heaviest element.
uranium. Its atomic number is 92 because it has that many elec-
trons and protons. It may have 142, 143, or 146 neutrons. So its
atomic weight may be 234, 235, or 238.

These three varieties of uranium atom are called “isotopes.”

There are several isotopes of almost all the other elements, too.

6

STRUCTURE OF ATOMS
HYDROGEN ATOM 1 ELECTRON

ee
e

NUCLEUS @

(1 PROTON)

URANIUM ATOM

PROTONS 92 92 92
NEUTRONS 142 143 146
TOTAL 234 235 238

Chemically all the isotopes of an element act exactly alike be-
cause they all have the same number of electrons per atom. It is
the number and arrangement of the electrons in the outer space
of the atom that determine its chemical behavior. And it is the
interlocking of these outer electrons that takes place when atoms

—
‘

of various elements combine and recombine in a chemical re-
action.

Chemical reactions, of course, are fairly easy to produce. This
is because the forces of attraction between atoms in a compound
are relatively weak. When you strike a match it bursts into flame
because the atoms are being rearranged—their electrons are doing
violent acrobatics and some of the energy that formerly held
them in the original compound is given off in the form of heat.

If you touch the match to a firecracker the same sort of per-
formance is repeated, but it happens more quickly and violently.
And if it were TNT, you wouldn't think the forces involved were

“relatively weak” as we just said.

ATOMIC ENERGY

Actually we are comparing these chemical forces to a kind of
force we know very little about. Since opposite electrical charges
attract one another, we can understand that negative electrons
and positive protons ordinarily hold together in the atom. But,
since like charges repel each other, why don’t the protons in the
nucleus fly apart?

Some force holds them together, a kind of force much stronger
than any we are familiar with. An inch-thick soap-bubble film—
in which the atoms are held together by ordinary attraction—
might be strong enough to hold up a fly. An inch of material held
together by nuclear forces would support the moon. When re-
arrangement of the electrical forces. between atoms gives the
power of TNT, it is easy to see that rearrangement in the nucleus
should release energy many millions of times greater.

Since 1905 scientists have had some theoretical idea of the
amount of energy that might be released. In that year, Albert
Einstein suggested that mass (or weight) and energy are aspects
of the same thing and might be interchangeable. According to
his formula the amount of energy would be equal to the mass

8

multiplied by the square of the velocity of light. Thus a small
amount of mass would make a very considerable amount of
energy. If all the mass of one pound of coal could be directly con-
verted into energy, it would equal the energy released in burning
one and one-third million tons of coal.

The same formula applies, and energy in the same enormous
ratio would be released, in converting the mass of a single atom.
But atomic energy at the present time is not a matter of turning
all the mass of an atom into energy—only a small part of it, and
only of certain kinds of atoms.

We have said that neutrons and protons both weigh 1. Actually
very sensitive instruments show curious variations in the weight
of these particles. They weigh slightly more in atoms of the light
elements, like hydrogen, and the heavy elements, like uranium,
than they do in the intermediate elements. To nuclear scientists
this posed a problem: if the nucleus of a heavy element could be
disturbed, altered to produce different elements, wouldn't the
pieces weigh less than the original atom and wouldn't the differ-
ence in weight be given off in energy?

Experiments to verify this possibility were going on in labora-
tories in many countries in the early 1930's. In Italy in 1934, En-
rico Fermi discovered that something peculiar happened to
uranium when it was bombarded by neutrons. In 1938 Otto
Hahn in Germany and Lise Meitner in Denmark found that the
uranium atom split practically in two, giving two elements in the
middle of the scale plus other particles and tremendous energy.

CHAIN REACTIONS

If some of these flying particles turned out to be additional neu-
trons from the atom just split, it seemed possible they might be
made to collide with other uranium atoms. Fissions of these atoms
in turn would produce more neutrons which might fly off and hit
still other atoms, and so on in a “chain reaction.” If such a chain

9

CHAIN REACTION

NEUTRON

reaction just barely kept going, the energy released in the splitting
of every atom would be useable in the form of heat to produce
steam for power.

If the chain reaction built up rapidly, however, it would pro-
duce an explosion of immense power. Scientists realized the ter-
rible possibilities, but assumed nothing would come of them for
many years. Then the war started, and nuclear experimentation
became top secret. It was pushed forward in a race to use atomic
energy in a bomb.

The problems faced by the scientists were not easy to solve.
One of the chief difficulties arose out of the fact that the uranium
atoms that split are those of the 235 isotope, which comprises
only 0.7 per cent of natural uranium, while 99.3 per cent of natu-
ral uranium is the 238 isotope. U238 atoms usually don't split
when hit by fast-flying neutrons but absorb them to become
atoms of a new element called “plutonium.” To keep a chain re-

action going, therefore, some way had to be found to make sure

10

that at least one of the neutrons released in the fission of a U235
atom would hit another U235 atom.

There seemed to be two possibilities that might work. One of
these, obviously, would be to separate out the U235. The other
possibility depends on the fact that “slow” neutrons can’t pene-
trate U238, while U235 is more likely to catch the “slow” ones.
The neutrons from fission are very fast. If they could be slowed
down, then there would be less chance of their hitting U238 and
a greater chance that they might hit U235.

It is impossible to separate uranium 255 from uranium 238 by
any chemical means because they are electrically identical. But a
number of schemes were investigated which depend on the very
slight difference in weight. Several of them proved to be feasible,
and vast factories were built at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, for this
purpose.

The other possibility is useless for an explosion. But it is the
way to produce controlled atomic power from the breaking up of
uranium 235. It is also the way to produce—at the same time-
the new element plutonium. Like U235, plutonium is fissionable
and therefore a source of atemic energy. This process has great
importance for both power and military purposes, so it is worth-

while to describe just how it works.

THE PLUTONIUM PILE
Let us suppose that we have a small chunk of normal uranium
metal. If a slow neutron enters the ore, it may hit a U235 atom
and cause it to split. Several new, fast neutrons will be produced.
But, because atoms are mostly space, these neutrons are likely to
escape from the chunk without hitting another nucleus.

If this: first chunk is surrounded by a large amount of material
that does not absorb neutrons, the neutrons will bounce against
the atomic nuclei of this material and lose energy through the

collisions. If there is a lot of the slowing-down material with small

5
1]

chunks of uranium placed here and there in it, some neutrons that
start in one chunk will eventually get into another. Then they are
more likely to hit atoms of U235. Of course many neutrons will
still escape to the outside and some will hit U238 before they
are slowed down. The reaction will only work in very large piles
of such material—hence the name pile for atomic power plants.

When the neutrons hit U238, it is made into the element plu-
tonium. Since this element does not occur in nature we know that
it will disintegrate in time, but it lasts for a number of years. Like
U235, it is fissionable. Unlike U235, it is a different chemical so
that it can be separated from the uranium by chemical processes.

The three big production piles at Hanford, Washington, use
pure carbon for the slowing-down material. Water containing
heavy hydrogen is used in the pile in Canada.

At the present time uranium seems to be the only practicable
raw material for atomic energy. Thorium and protactinium have
possibilities, but the former must be used with uranium and the
latter is very rare. Uranium is one of the commoner elements in
the earth’s crust and is present in sea water. But only a few con-
centrated deposits are known to exist.

Some other heavy elements can be split by neutrons. But they
cannot be used as a source of energy because they do not give
off enough neutrons to carry on a chain reaction. The lightest
elements also have excess energy. Hydrogen, one of the common-
est of all elements, is a possible source of atomic energy. Although
it is believed to be the source of the sun’s energy, scientists have
not yet found a way to use it on the earth. The intermediate
elements do not have any excess energy available.

In the meantime, there appears to be enough uranium available
to fill reasonable demands for hundreds of years of peaceful use.
The chief known workable deposits are in Czechoslovakia, the
Belgian Congo, and Canada; other deposits are in Colorado,

Soviet Turkestan, and Saxony.

12

THE BOMB

Although the details of these various processes were worked out
during the war, the general ideas described above were known to
nuclear physicists in every country. What about the “secret” of
the bomb?

Let us assume that we have some pure fissionable material—
uranium 235 or plutonium, a very small piece. It is a harmless-
looking metal. Now there are always stray neutrons around that
are produced by cosmic rays or come from traces of radioactive
material. In fact about a thousand pass through your body every
second. So some neutrons will be going into the piece of fission-
able material and some will hit nuclei and produce fissions. When
this happens several more neutrons will be produced. But most
of them will get outside before they hit another nucleus. (Re-
member that the atoms are mostly space. ) Perhaps a stray neu-
tron will start off a chain reaction that will break up several
atoms; but the chain will soon die out as neutrons get lost.

If we now bring another chunk alongside the first, atoms in
either piece may be hit by some of the neutrons escaping from
the other. As more pieces are added there will come a time when
the reaction will continue to expand, instead of dying out. This is
a good time to be far away because there will be an explosion.

PRINCIPLE OF THE BOMB

. UNDER
S CRITICAL SIZE

EXPLODES WHEN PUT TOGETHER

UNDER
CRITICAL SIZE

13.

It the material is brought together slowly in this way, the ex-
plosion will push the material apart before many atoms have had
a chance to disintegrate. As soon as the material starts to separate,
neutrons will leak out through the holes and the chain reaction
will stop. Such an explosion will be very inefficient.

So the only problem in making a bomb is to start with two or
more chunks, none of which separately will do anything, and then
bring them together very quickly. About the fastest way that one
can think of for bringing the pieces together is to shoot them to-
gether, so this is the “secret” of the atomic bomb. Of course, the
actual design and the safety devices and the fusing are schemes
that we can keep secret. But it should be clear that these are not

very fundamental and that there are many ways of doing them.

SECRECY AND SECURITY

No, there aren’t any important fundamental secrets, no new ele-
ments or physical processes. But we do have a big lead in the
atomic field, or at least we did when the war ended.

By 1942, only a few hundred thousand dollars had been spent
in this country on atomic research. Between that time and the
end of the war, we spent two billion dollars on research, plant
construction, and production. This meant man-hours and mate-
rials. It also meant the highest degree of cooperation of science
and industry and the military to pool the best technical knowl-
edge and skill of the United States, England, and Canada. We
have had a monopoly; we have been the only country that could
produce fissionable materials and bombs in quantity. It is true
that we have learned some tricks that might be useful to a com-
petitor, but our real advantage is in the existence of our elaborate
factories for making fissionable material and the technicians who
have learned the nearly infinite details of their construction and
operation. An average scientist who worked on the project knows
only a small part of this important technical information.

14

As we have seen, atomic physics progressed slowly over a
period of a half-century. Major contributions came from nearly
every important country in the world. The rapid development of
the Manhattan project was possible because it was a technical
application of known principles. Future developments will be
slow indeed if rigid secrecy is imposed on research. One never
knows when a new discovery may be of great importance—scien-
tists were only trying to find out about atoms when they dis-
covered how to release atomic energy.

Some compromise must be made in this difficult after-the-war
period. The technology of bombs should be closely guarded until
it can be given to a responsible world agency. But too much
secrecy will slow down atomic science in this country. Real
security can be achieved only through effective world control of
atomic energy and the abolition of war. Until these can be
brought about through the United Nations, the problem of se-

crecy will be highly technical and very difficult.

PEACETIME USES

At the present moment, three nonmilitary possibilities of using
atomic energy loom largest: power, medical treatment, and re-
search.

Atomic power plants will soon be a reality—at least for ex-
perimental purposes. Scientists are working on a model plant at
Oak Ridge now.

The big piles at Hanford were designed to produce plutonium,
so the enormous amount of heat they give off is carried away in
the water of the Columbia River. With a pile of different design,
the heat could be used to make steam for electric power genera-
tion. But the piles also give off intense radiations more deadly
than X-rays, and must be heavily shielded with lead or concrete.
While atomic power may be practical for large ships, theretore,
it isn’t suitable for automobiles or locomotives.

15

Atomic power will probably be more expensive than coal at
first; but in a few years its cost may come down—and the price
of coal may go up—to a point where it can compete. Its first use
is likely to be in regions where there is little or no coal. It should
open up new frontiers of industry and settlement in many parts
of the world.

England, Russia, Sweden, and France are all pushing research
on atomic power to open up new areas or to replace dwindling
stocks of coal. The possibilities are very attractive to countries
less rich in natural resources than our own. But it is important to
remember that atomic power plants may also produce bomb ma-
terial. They are a two-edged investment.

Atomic piles can also be used to produce large quantities of
radioactive materials. Uranium and radium are two of a number
of naturally radioactive elements. They are called “unstable” be-
cause their atoms automatically break down, one at a time, giving
off particles or spurts of radiation. The natural elements can also
be made radioactive by neutron bombardment.

The cyclotron, invented in 1932, could do this in small amounts;
an atomic pile can produce virtually unlimited quantities. In this
fact lies great hope for medical and biological research and pos-
sibly the treatment of certain diseases.

The particles or radiations given off by unstable atoms show up
on sensitive instruments. They can be traced, therefore, as they
pass through the body and will tell us a great deal about how the
various organs work and about the cause and nature of disease.
Like radium and X-rays, they may be useful in treatments too.
A great deal of research lies ahead before we know how much
they will do, but with so much radioactive material available,
rapid progress is expected.

The possibilities in general biological research are less apparent
but perhaps even more exciting. For example, growing plants use
the sun’s energy in a complicated process that takes place in green

16

leaves. Scientists, using atomic tools of research, may be able to
discover how this is done and find out much more efficient ways
to make food and clothes and fuel.

With the discovery of atomic energy, we are certainly closer to
answering the question: What is life? But first we must answer
another question: Can we stay alive?

NO DEFENSE

Shortly after the war a group of top atomic scientists met in
Washington with a number of congressmen and government
officials to discuss the problems posed by atomic energy. The
scientists told their story and the guests asked many penetrating
questions. As the discussion was about to break up a Senator
turned to the scientist sitting next to him. “What you have to say
is very interesting,” he said, “but I know you smart young men
will work out a defense.”

Of course, the smart young men will try. But they know the
task is impossible. Bullets can be stopped, yet many reach their
mark to kill a man. Atomic bombs kill cities. No matter how good
the defenses, if there is a war some atomic bombs will get through.

Atomic explosions are set off by ordinary explosions so that the
problem is very little different from stopping a conventional
bomb or rocket. There are no special rays or other tricks. The
problem is to shoot down the plane or rocket before it reaches its
objective.

Defense experts have talked about a network of two hundred
radar stations all over the United States to detect approaching
airplanes and missiles. Estimates of the number of men required
to man these stations run from 100,000 to 200,000. But the great-
est technological system is no sounder than the alertness of the
men who operate it, working monotonously twenty-four hours of
every day.

And detection is only the first small part of the total problem

17

of defense. Then, in the space of a few seconds, it is necessary to
distinguish between enemy and friendly craft, to calculate their
course, and to direct projectiles or pursuit ships to intercept them.

Under the very best circumstances in the last war it was never
possible to prevent many enemy bombers from getting through.
When V-2 rockets which travel faster than a shell from a cannon
are perfected it will be impossible to stop more than a few.

Even more sinister is the possibility of sabotage. Do you re-
member those pictures of the second Bikini test? A bomb ex-
ploded a few feet under water caused a waterspout a mile high
and a third of a mile in diameter. An atomic bomb can easily be
hidden in the hold of a ship. The most sensitive instruments in
the world cannot detect its radioactivity for more than a few feet.
If such a bomb were exploded in New York harbor, the blast
would demolish buildings for half a mile. The radioactivity would
settle from the water cloud over virtually the entire metropolitan
area. For miles it would become uninhabitable.

The only alternative to world control is to take measures to
reduce the damage that an atomic attack might do. This would
mean giving up our cities and spreading people, industries, and
defenses around the countryside. There is no way of estimating
the cost of this in dollars and in the disruption of our economy.
But it would certainly bring regimentation approaching if not
equaling that of a totalitarian state. Merely preparing for atomic
war would destroy civil and economic liberties and poison the

American way of life.

18

Harnessing
the Atom

ERNEST K. LINDLEY

A bomb exploded in the air over the Japanese city of Hiroshima
early on the morning of August 6, 1945. Sixteen hours later in
Washington the White House issued a statement by President
Truman about that particular bomb.

It was, he announced, an atomic bomb. This meant a new era
had begun, not only in technology but also in relations among
nations.

The few who had known in advance about the atom bomb
were not only concerned about the military use of this new
weapon. They knew it could be used in ways that would destroy
civilization. They also knew that atomic energy could be used in
ways to bring great benefits to mankind. And they knew that the
processes involved were much the same for either use.

These scientists and government officials in the inner circle felt
their responsibility very keenly. Having discovered how to re-
lease atomic energy, they were anxious that it be harnessed to
constructive instead of destructive purposes. As the scientific and
technical problems were solved, they put more and more thought

on how to control the giant child of their brains.

19

THE UNDERLYING THEMES
As these officials and top scientists saw it, all aspects of the devel-
opment of atomic energy within the United States should be
firmly in the hands of the government. Internationally, they felt
sure that nothing short of a foolproof system of observation and
control in all nations would insure against an atomic Armageddon.
Until that system was created, they felt it would be unwise to tell
everything they knew about atomic energy and its use in a bomb.
President Truman in his statement about the Hiroshima bomb

put it this way:

It has never been the habit of the scientists of this country
or the policy of this government to withhold from the world
scientific knowledge. Normally, therefore, everything about
the work with atomic energy would be made public.

But under present circumstances it is not intended to divulge
the technical processes of production or all the military applica-
tions, pending further investigation of possible methods of pro-
tecting us antl the rest of the world from the danger of sudden

destruction.

Through all the later discussions of what to do about atomic
energy have run the themes outlined in the President’s statement;
we wanted to divulge all the information we had and help to
harness this vast new source of energy for the good of mankind;
but we wanted to make sure first that the knowledge would not
be used to destroy us and the world. This meant, clearly, that
atomic energy would have to be put under effective international
control.

The arguments about the hows, whens, and how muches of this
program for international control were reflected and paralleled
in similar arguments about the domestic control system. We
shan’t discuss here the internal issues or their settlement in the
Atomic Energy Act of 1946. But the close connection between the
domestic and the international aspects is recognized in this law.

20

NATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

PRESIDENT

aD
DEPT. OF DEPT. OF
WAR NAVY

ATOMIC ENERGY ae ae
COMMISSION

5 CIVILIANS APPOINTED BY MILITARY LIAISON

PRESIDENT WITH CONSENT COMMITTEE

OF SENATE ; : :

6 OFFICERS APPOINTED
9 CIVILIANS APPOINTED BY SECRETARIES OF
FUNCTIONS:
BY PRESIDENT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT WAS AND NAVY
OWNERSHIP OF PLANTS,
MATERIALS, ETC.
PRODUCTION OF FISSIONABLE
MATERIALS
CONTROL OF USES AND PATENTS
EXECUTION OF INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS
CONTROL OF INFORMATION
REPORT TO CONGRESS

|

MANAGER

GENERAL ADVISORY
COMMITTEE

me

C_ I ._)

RESEARCH PRODUCTION ENGINEERING MILITARY

oy | cams | | ee]

GRAPHIC ASSOCIATES

The national Atomic Energy Commission is, in effect, prohibited
from sharing certain types of information with other nations until
Congress decides that adequate international safeguards have
been established. But after that, any provisions of the Atomic
Energy Act which conflict with the international system shall be
without force, and the Commission is instructed to “give maxi-
mum effect to the policies contained in any such international
agreement.”

As a matter of fact, if the United States plan for international
control is adopted, most if not all of the powers of the national
Atomic Energy Commission will be transferred to the Interna-

tional Atomic Development Authority.

STIMSON SETS THE STAGE

Among the few people who knew what was brewing at Oak
Ridge, Hanford, and Los Alamos was Secretary of War Henry L.
Stimson.

On April 25, 1945, nearly three and one-half months before
the bombing of Hiroshima, Mr. Stimson took a memorandum on
this subject to the President. Major General Leslie R. Groves,
head of the Manhattan District, went with him. This was the
first time Mr. Truman, then in the White House only nine days,
learned in detail about the atomic project. As chairman of the
Senate War Investigating Committee he had patriotically com-
plied with a request not to pry into it, because of the need for
complete secrecy.

Mr. Stimson was the cabinet officer entrusted by President
Roosevelt with the over-all responsibility for developing the
atomic bomb. He was one of our most experienced and wisest
public officials. His memorandum sets forth so clearly the major
facts and the conclusions to which they point that it deserves to
be summarized here as the first basic document on the interna-
tional control of atomic energy:

22

1. “Within four months we shall in all probability have com-
pleted the most terrible weapon ever known in human his-
tory... .”

The United States at present controls the means of making
and using this weapon “and no other nation could reach this
position for some years.”

3. Although few scientists know the whole process of pro-
ducing **, many in many countries know various segments. Al-
though its construction now requires great scientific and in-
dustrial effort, easier and cheaper means of production prob-
ably will be found. “As a result, it is extremely probable that
the future will make it possible for atomic bombs to be con-
structed by smaller nations or even groups, or at least by a
larger nation in a much shorter time.”

4. The time is likely to come, therefore, when such a weapon
can be constructed in secret and used suddenly with devastat-
ing power by a willful aggressor. “With its aid even a ver)
powerful unsuspecting nation might be conquered within a
very few days by a very much euneliee one.”

5. With this weapon, “modern civilization might be com-
pletely destroyed.”

6. In working out a world peace organization, the leaders ot
our country should appreciate the power of the atomic bomb.

“No system of control heretofore considered would be adequate
to control this menace. Both inside any particular country and
between the nations of the world, the control of this weapon
will undoubtedly be a matter of the greatest difficulty and
would involve such thoroughgoing rights of inspection and
internal control as we have never ievotedove contemplated.”

7. The sharing of the bomb becomes “a primary question of
our foreign relations.” Our leadership in its development and in
the war has placed upon us a moral obligation “which we can-
not shirk without very serious responsibility for any disaster to
civilization which it would further.”

8. On the other hand, if the problem of the proper use of
atomic energy can be solved, “we would have the opportunity
to bring the world into a pattern” in which peace and our
civilization can be saved.

bo
w

ARCHITECTS OF AMERICAN POLICY

During his talk with President Truman on April 25, 1945, Secre-
tary Stimson proposed the appointment of a special committee on
atomic energy. Its members should be noted. Five of them had
been associated with the atomic project from its inception or soon
thereafter: Mr. Stimson, chairman; George L. Harrison, one of his
special assistants; Dr. Vannevar Bush, director of the Office of
Scientific Research and Development; Dr. James B. Conant,
President of Harvard and chairman of the National Defense Re-
search Committee; and Dr. Karl T. Compton, President of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and an important official
of the OSRD.

To these were added James F. Byrnes, as the President’s per-
sonal representative (he was then a private citizen in the interval
between his service as Director of War Mobilization and his ap-
pointment as Secretary of State); Ralph A. Bard, Under Secre-
tary of the Navy; and William L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of
State. Advising the committee were four nuclear physicists of the
highest rank who had important roles in the atomic project: Drs.
A. H. Compton, Enrico Fermi, E. O. Lawrence, and J. R. Oppen-
heimer.

The first duty of this committee was to advise the President on
the use of the atomic bomb against Japan. But it was also to draft
recommendations for the Executive and Congress on the postwar
treatment of atomic energy. Most of the official United States
actions and statements on atomic energy of the next eight months
had their source in this committee.

On October 29, the Senate created a Special Committee on
Atomic Energy. This group of eleven, under the chairmanship of
Senator Brien McMahon of Connecticut, held exhaustive hear-
ings, some of them behind closed doors. Its main specific achieve-
ment was the drafting of legislation for the national control of
atomic energy. But most of its members belonged also to the im-

24

portant standing committees on Foreign Relations, Military
Afiairs, or Naval Affairs. They soon began to exert great influence
on the framing of policies concerning the international control of
atomic energy. Among them were Senators Vandenberg and
Connally, who went with Secretary of State Byrnes to most of
the international conferences of 1946, and Senator Warren R.
Austin, who later became the United States representative on
the UN Security Council.

In April 1946 this Special Senate Committee issued a report
which in many of its major conclusions closely paralleled Mr.

Stimson’s memorandum of a year earlier.

TRUMAN TALKS WITH ATTLEE AND KING

In a message to Congress of October 3, 1945, asking it to enact
laws for the national control of atomic energy, President Truman
announced that he would initiate discussions of international con-
trol. Such discussions, he said, could not safely be delayed until
the United Nations was in a position “adequately to deal” with
the problem. (The United Nations did not come into official ex-
istence until October 24 and the Security Council and Assembly
were not organized until the following January. )

We had two partners in the atomic enterprise: Great Britain
and Canada. They had pooled their scientific resources with
ours. The Canadians also had provided some raw materials. It
was proper that the next step should be to consult these partners.
Accordingly, Prime Minister Attlee of Great Britain and Prime
Minister King of Canada with their advisers came to Washington
in November 1945 to confer with President Truman. They agreed
that the responsibility for leadership in proposing international
controls rested on the three nations which had the essential
knowledge, but that the responsibility for working out precise
means of control rested on all nations. They decided, therefore,
to ask the United Nations to set up a special commission.

25

THE A-B-C CHIEFS AGREE

The conclusions of these heads of states were published on No
vember 15 in a document known as the Three-Nation Agreed
Declaration.

For three reasons, the exact language of a portion of this decla-
ration merits close attention: (J) it was embodied without change
in the subsequent Moscow agreement and in the resolution sub-
mitted to the United Nations; (2) it gave rise to a controversy:
and (3) it included a phrase which later played an important
part in the broader problem of regulating armaments generally.

This section, outlining the task of the proposed UN Atomic
Energy Commission, read:

In particular the Commission should make specific proposals:

(a) For extending between all nations the exchange of
basic scientific information for peaceful ends,

(b) For control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to
ensure its use only for peaceful purposes,

(c) For the elimination from national armaments of atomic
weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass

destruction,
(d) For effective safeguards by way of inspection and other

means to protect complvi ing states against the hazards of viola-

tions and evasions.

The work of the Commission should proceed by separate
stages, the successful completion of each one of which will de-
velop the necessary confidence of the world before the next

stage is undertaken.

This statement aroused misgivings among those who thought
first in terms of security. In outlining a “step-by-step” procedure,
it listed the exchange of scientific information first and effective
safeguards last.

In earlier passages the signers drew a distinction between two
kinds of atomic knowledge. The “basic scientific information

essential to the development of atomic energy for peaceful pur-

26

poses,” they pointed out, had already been published (notably in
the Smyth report issued just after V-] Day by the Manhattan
District). They said they would continue to follow the policy of
free disclosure of this kind of information as it developed, and
hoped other nations would do the same.

But, they said, “detailed information concerning the practical
industrial application of atomic energy,” because of its close
parallel to military application, would not be released before
“effective, reciprocal, and enforceable safeguards” had been de-
vised.

Where was the line between basic scientific information and
specialized information for practical application? Having made
the distinction, the declaration did not draw the boundary line.
The line is extremely difficult to draw. It comes down to a matter
of judgment in individual cases—judgment requiring precise
scientific and technical knowledge. Even the Smyth report had
divulged facts which many people thought went beyond the
domain of basic science. For example, it had revealed that there
were four ways—all successful—of separating U235 from U238.
With this knowledge, another nation setting out to make atomic
bombs probably would choose one method and stick to it, thus
saving time and expense in duplicating our achievement.

There was a further complication. It is almost impossible to
conceal information from other governments and at the same time
make it freely available to all our own scientists and engineers.
There are so many of them that the information would have to
be printed and distributed by the thousands of copies. Yet scien-
tists and technicians cannot do their best work, and make the
most rapid progress, unless they can compare notes with their
colleagues. Most of the scientists who testified before the Mc-
Mahon committee placed great emphasis on this point.

The issue here was not a choice between black and white. It
was between more and less. Many members of Congress feared

97

al

that the intention was to interpret the phrase “basic scientific in-
formation” very generously and that, as a result, our national
safety would be impaired.

The particular phrase which later became so important in dis-
cussion of general reductions in armaments was “all other major
weapons adaptable to mass destruction.” It caused little comment
when it first appeared in the Three-Nation Agreed Declaration.
It was prompted by secret wartime developments in biological
and related forms of warfare. These had not been used, and very
little about them had yet been published. But many informed ex-
perts looked upon them as the potential equal of atomic weapons

for destroying human beings in wholesale lots.

STALIN CONCURS

After the agreement with Britain and Canada, the next step was
to consult the Russians. Without Russia’s cooperation effective
world-wide control of atomic energy was impossible. Responsible
officials realized that it was important to explain our intentions
to the Soviet government as soon as possible.

Accordingly, Secretary Byrnes brought up the matter at the
meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the Soviet
Union, and Great Britain, in Moscow in December 1945. The
Russians promptly agreed to join in presenting the A-B-C pro-
posal to the United Nations. They asked for, and were granted,
only a few amendments clarifying and strengthening the Security
Council's control over the UN Atomic Energy Commission.

It was agreed that France and China, the other two perma-
nent members of the Security Council, plus Canada because of
its part in the development of atomic energy, should be invited
to be sponsors of the resolution. It was also agreed that the UN
Atomic Energy Commission should be composed of one member
from each state on the Security Council plus Canada when it was

not a member of the Security Council.

28

The Moscow resolution contained the passage from the Three-
Nation Agreed Declaration quoted above. Nothing was added
to allay the fears that we would be required to give away our
secret knowledge before there were any safeguards against its
misuse. The White House was promptly notified that important
leaders in the Senate, of both parties, would oppose any plan
which put disclosures of information ahead of effective safe-
guards. In Senator Vandenberg’s phrase, disclosures and safe-

guards must “work in double harness.”

THE SENATE IS REASSURED

On his return from Moscow, Mr. Byrnes hastened to report that
“jt was intended and is understood that the matter of safeguards
will apply to the recommendations of the commission in relation
to every phase of the subject and at every stage.” He said that the
numbered paragraphs were not intended to indicate the order in
which the commission should take them up—that, on the contrary,
as the resolution stated, the commission should “enquire into all
phases of the problem, and make such recommendations from
time to time with respect to them as it finds possible.”

Mr. Byrnes gave three other assurances. The Commission could
not compel the United States or any other government to give in-
formation. Secondly, it would have no power to take any action,
only the power to recommend to the Security Council, where the
interests of the United States could be protected at every step by
a veto. Thirdly, no agreement on international control would be
put into effect without prior approval by the Senate or Congress
through a treaty or resolution.

These assurances quieted an incipient revolt in the Senate.
Thereafter Mr. Byrnes made it a point to consult the Senate
leaders. Senators Connally and Vandenberg went with him to the
important international conferences of 1946 in Paris and New
York. The bipartisan front on foreign policy was strengthened

29

and extended to include the international control of atomic

energy.

THE UN TAKES OVER

On January 24, during the first meeting of the UN General As-
sembly, Senator Connally presented on behalf of the five perma-
nent members of the Security Council and Canada, the resolution
agreed upon at Moscow. He quoted Secretary Byrnes’ interpreta-
tion: (1) that the numbering of four objectives in the resolution
was not intended to indicate the order in which they were to be
considered; and (2) that it was intended and understood that sate-
guards would apply to every phase and stage of the detailed plan
to be worked out.

The resolution was adopted unanimously, first by the Political
and Security Committee, to which it was referred, then by the
General Assembly. The first meeting of the UN Atomic Energy
Commission was scheduled for June 14, 1946, in New York City.

ISSUES OF INSPECTION

Everyone was talking about “controls” and “effective safeguards.”
What, concretely, did these words mean? Most people thought
they meant, first of all, international inspection. Secretary Stimson
had said that preventing the secret production of atomic weapons
would require “such throughgoing rights of inspection .. . as
we have never heretofore contemplated.” But to some it seemed
that an effective system of inspection would be too huge and com-
plicated to be practical.

This was one reason why some thinkers on the subject empha-
sized the importance of a free international exchange of informa-
tion and scientists. They argued that if the scientists of all nations
could communicate freely and move back and forth, any govern-
ment would find it hard to hide the fact that it was making such

weapons as atomic bombs. They looked upon such a free inter-

30

change among scientists as at least a partial substitute, or back-
stop, for inspection.

Doubt that inspection could be made effective also influenced
those whose instinct was to hug the “secrets” of atomic energy.
Some of them realized that we could not long retain a monopoly
on atomic weapons. But, they argued, if we kept a large supply
of them on hand, so that we could retaliate swiftly and terribly,
another nation would hesitate to attack us even if it had atomic
bombs. They said: suppose, in return for a system of international
inspection, we stop making bombs and destroy our stockpiles;
then suppose that the international inspectors fail to detect that
some other government, or group, is producing atomic weapons;
then we would be helpless.

There was still a third point of view: if there were another great
war, atomic weapons would be used. Therefore, why waste time
and energy on the international control of atomic energy? Con-
centrate, instead, on preventing another great war! Efforts to per-
suade people who took this view that there might be some ad-
vantages in international control of atomic energy—that indeed it
might help to prevent another war—were hampered by the ap-
parently formidable difficulties of creating an effective system of

inspection.

THE ACHESON AND LILIENTHAL GROUPS
A more definite study of “controls” and “effective safeguards” was
needed. Shortly after his return from Moscow, Secretary Byrnes
appointed a committee of five: Dean Acheson, Under Secretary
of State, chairman; John J. McCloy, former Assistant Secretary
of War; and three men who had supervised the development of
atomic energy: Dr. Vannevar Bush, Dr. James B. Conant, and
Major General Groves.

This committee, in turn, appointed a board of five consultants.
with David E. Lilienthal, then head of the Tennessee Valley Au-

31

thority, as chairman. It included one nuclear physicist, Dr. J-
Robert Oppenheimer, who had been in charge of the atomic
bomb laboratory at Los Alamos during the war. It included the
top technicians from two of the large corporations which had
made important contributions to the success of the Manhattan
project: Dr. Charles Allen Thomas, Vice-President and Technical
Director of the Monsanto Chemical Company, and Harry A.
Winne, Vice-President in charge of engineering policy for the
General Electric Company. The fifth member was a prominent
business executive: Chester I. Barnard, President of the New Jer-
sey Telephone Company.

This board of five consultants, composed of men of widely
varying backgrounds and experience, undertook a fresh, detailed
study. They had access to all the scientific and technical knowl-
edge of the Manhattan project. As they explored and thought and
talked, they gradually found themselves driven to a set of com-
mon conclusions. They tested these in meetings with the super-
vising committee under Mr. Acheson.

The result of the combined work of these two groups was the
Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy, made pub-
lic on March 28, 1946. It is better known as the Acheson-Lilien-
thal Report, after the two chairmen. It was intended for the guid-
ance of policy-making officials—in the words of the report, “not as
a final plan, but as a place to begin, a foundation on which to
build.” It was soon acclaimed, however, as a remarkable piece
of careful, constructive thinking. It became the backbone of the
plan submitted to the UN Atomic Energy Commission by the
United States.

INSPECTION ISN'T ENOUGH

The Acheson-Lilienthal report concluded that it would not be
safe to rely on international inspection alone to detect violations
of an agreement to outlaw atomic weapons. The inspection force

32

would have to be very large and would have to include many
highly trained specialists. Such a force would be very difficult, if
not impossible, to recruit. For most technically qualified men
would not be attracted by the purely negative work of serving as
detectives and policemen; they would prefer to engage in creative
activities. Even if an initial force could be recruited and trained,
it could not be expected to keep abreast of the march of science
and technology. It could not possibly know as much as the best
scientists and technicians who were constantly at work in their
laboratories.

The report found other serious weaknesses in a system of inter-
national control which allowed the production of atomic energy
to remain in the hands of either private individuals or national
governments. Among them was the intense competition, already
under way, to obtain control of the raw materials of atomic
energy. This, the authors thought, was a dangerous, probably
war-breeding form of national rivalry.

THE REPORT LOOKS FARTHER
The Acheson-Lilienthal report did not stop with these rather dis-
couraging findings, however. It set forth a positive alternative: an
International Atomic Development Authority. This Authority
would do all the “dangerous” work in atomic energy production
throughout the world. It would own and operate the mines from
which the important raw materials came and all the “dangerous”
plants in which fissionable materials were separated, concentrated,
or produced in substantial quantities. It would have its own re-
search laboratories. It would be the custodian of atomic weapons,
if any were allowed to exist, and of all stockpiles of fissionable
materials. It alone would have the right to do research in the use
of atomic energy for military purposes.

Such an Authority, the authors felt, would be able to recruit
many of the best scientists and technicians. Their work would be

33

primarily constructive, and the Authority would have some of the
best facilities for research and experiment.

The Authority would have to make inspections to be sure that
atomic energy was not being produced illegally. But it would
start with the advantage of having all authorized facilities in its
own hands. If unauthorized atomic plants or mining operations
were discovered, it would not be necessary to find out how their
output was being used. The mere fact that they existed would
be proof that the international atomic agreement was being
violated.

DENATURING IS A POSSIBILITY

The report revealed and underlined two other points which
would help to reduce inspection to manageable proportions. The
first was that only two natural elements would need to be con-
trolled: uranium and thorium. Uranium is the only relatively
abundant element that can maintain a chain reaction. Absolutely
air-tight control of uranium would be an adequate safeguard at
the raw material end. However thorium, together with uranium,
can be used to make an atomic explosive. Therefore, as a double
check, thorium also should be controlled. While both uranium
and thorium are widely distributed, the known deposits rich
enough to mine are relatively few in number. Moreover, the two
elements are sometimes found together. Neither has many im-
portant uses except for the production of atomic energy. Thus
both of them could be mined, refined, and used by the Interna-
tional Atomic Development Authority without seriously interfer-
ing with existing industries.

The second encouraging technical fact brought out in the re-
port was that both U235 and plutonium could be “denatured.”
By “denatured,” it meant that they could be made strong enough
to generate power but too weak to explode. These “denatured”
fissionable materials would have to be made in “dangerous”

34

plants. But they then could be transferred to somewhat different
plants which would be relatively “safe.” They could be con-
verted into explosives, but only in plants similar to those in which
they were originally concentrated.

The authors thought that plants using these “denatured” ma-
terials could safely be left in national or private hands. The
plants would have to be watched to be sure that they were not
remodeled to make explosive atomic energy or that the fissionable
materials deposited in them were not secretly shipped to unau-
thorized “dangerous” plants.

Various scientists and technicians warned that it would be a
mistake to rely too heavily on “denaturing” as a safeguard. Never-
theless, “denaturing” seemed to offer a way of lightening some-
what the burden of international control and inspection. Also,
plants using “denatured” materials might be placed where they
were most needed to produce power.

In building “dangerous” plants, on the other hand, the Author-
ity would have to preserve a strategic balance, so that no nation
would have more than a minority of the plants within its quick
grasp. Then if one nation went berserk, the others would still re-
tain a majority of the plants which could be used in making atom-
ic weapons. The fear of swift retribution would, it was argued,
make any government, no matter how evil its purposes, hesitate
to seize the international atomic plants within its reach.

NO SUDDEN CURE FOR WAR
Even if an International Atomic Development Authority were
created and granted all the powers it needed, it could not jump
into full-scale operation overnight. It would have to move step by
step over a period of years. The Acheson-Lilienthal plan recog-
nized that in this long process disclosure of information and safe-
guards should march together.

The Authority's first major task, according to the Acheson-

Of
oo

CENTRAL POINTS OF THE
INSPECTION ALONE WOULD NOT GIVE SECURITY

BECAUSE IT WOULD BE TOO UNMANAGE-
* ABLE

BECAUSE IT WOULD FOSTER SUSPICION
AND FRICTION

3 SECAUSE BEST SCIENTISTS WOULDN'T
WANT TO BE POLICEMEN

4 BECAUSE INSPECTORS COULDN'T KEEP UP
WITH SCIENCE'S PROGRESS

—
JOURN 4, OF
NUCLE ag PAYS
= ' - bn 4
~ Se

Lilienthal report, should be to get a firm hold on source materials.

This would involve taking over

the major known deposits of

uranium and thorium and making a world-wide search for others.
Thus the first step would indicate whether all governments had
agreed in good faith to international control, including inspection.
For the uranium- and thorium-hunters of the Authority would be-

gin at once to make their surveys,

by air and on the ground. They

would have to be free to look almost everywhere.

When the Authority got ready
36

to build new plants to concen-

ACHESON-LILIENTHAL PLAN
ADA CONTROL WOULD STRENGTHEN SECURITY

1 BECAUSE IT WOULD ATTRACT BEST SCIEN- BECAUSE IT WOULD FOSTER PEACEFUL CO-
TISTS OPERATION

3 BECAUSE ALL NATIONS COULD SHARE NEW 4 BECAUSE IRREGULARITIES WOULD BE
DEVELOPMENTS IN PHYSICS EASILY DISCOVERED

GRAPHIC ASSOCIATES

trate fissionable materials it would need a very large part of our
secret technical knowledge and many of our industrial facilities.
But it would not need detailed information about the atomic
bomb. This could be held to the last, until we were satisfied that
the international control system was working all right.

The Acheson-Lilienthal report did not pretend to be a plan for
preventing war or for preventing resort to atomic weapons if
another war should occur. The men who wrote it realized that no
single plan or treaty could do either of these things. They sought

37

a limited but extremely important objective: to prevent surprise
atomic attacks, organized in secret and launched in overwhelm-
ing force. Under their plan, they contended, no nation or group
of men could prepare to wage atomic war without being detected
in the early stages. This would give other nations time to take pre-
ventive action or get ready to defend themselves or retaliate with
atomic weapons. No scheme for the international control of

atomic energy could be expected to guarantee more than that.

OUR ATOMIC ENERGY TEAM
Bernard M. Baruch, a distinguished elder statesman who had
been Chairman of the War Industries Board during the First
World War and adviser and “troubleshooter” for several Presi-
dents, was appointed United States Representative to the UN
Atomic Energy Commission. Mr. Baruch chose as his “co-
workers” John M. Hancock. New York banker and co-author of
the Baruch-Hancock report on postwar demobilization; Ferdi-
nana Eberstadt, an investment banker and lawyer who had been
Vice-Chairman of the War Production Board during the Second
World War and had worked out for the Navy department a plan
for better coordination of the armed services; Herbert Bayard
Swope, who had been associated with Mr. Baruch in the War
Industries Board; and Fred Searls, a mining engineer who had
served in the War Production Board and Office of War Mobiliza-
tion and Reconversion.

As his chief scientific adviser Mr. Baruch chose Dr. Richard C.
Tolman, Dean of the Graduate School of the California Institute
of Technology and a scientific adviser to the Manhattan project.
Dr. Tolman was assisted by a scientific panel which included Drs.
R. F. Bacher, A. H. Compton, J. R. Oppenheimer, C. A. Thomas,
I. I. Rabi, and H. C. Urey. Mr. Baruch also had the advice of Gen-
eral Groves of the Manhattan project, and later appointed as
one of his associates Mr. Thomas F. Farrell, a retired Major Gen-
eral who had been a deputy to General Groves.

38

BARUCH BRINGS UP THE VETO

After considerable study, Mr. Baruch decided to build his plan
for the international control of atomic energy on the Acheson-
Lilienthal report. He made, however, one very important addi-
tion. This dealt with punishment for violations of an international
atomic agreement.

Mr. Baruch held that the agreement must assure swift, certain,
and suitable punishment for major offenses. These would include
such violations as illegal possession of an atomic bomb, illegal
possession or separation of fissionable materials, seizure of any
property belonging to or licensed by the Atomic Development
Authority, and interference with the activities of the Authority.

As Mr. Baruch frankly declared, his proposals for punishment
went straight to the heart of the veto power in the UN Charter.
Under the Charter, any one of the five great powers sitting as
permanent members of the Security Council can veto action
against an aggressor. But, Mr. Baruch held, there must be no
power to veto or delay action against a violator of the atomic
energy treaty. A major violation would be almost certain proof
of intent to make atomic weapons for an aggressive war. To leave
any obstacle in the way of immediate and effective punishment
or preventive action wouid expose innocent nations to the hazards
of devastation, deteat, and perhaps extinction. In Mr. Baruch’s
words:

There must be no veto to protect those who violate their
solemn agreements not to develop or use atomic energy for
destructive purposes.

The bomb does not wait upon debate. To delay may be to
die. The time between violation and preventive action or pun-
ishment would be all too short for extended discussion as to
the course to be followed.

OTHERS WOULD OVERLOOK THE VETO
The Acheson-Lilienthal group had not dealt with the question of
punishment. They had been assigned to work out what might be

39

called a physical plan for international control. They had not
been asked to go into legal or judicial questions connected with
the UN Charter. They realized that a number of political ques-
tions which they had not covered would have to be brought up
in the negotiations.

Some members of this group felt, however, that it was useless,
unnecessary, and tactically unwise to reopen the veto question.
The Soviet Union was sure to object strenuously. At the San Fran-
cisco conference it had resisted every attempt to limit the veto, and
had brought the conference to a serious temporary impasse on this
very question. Later, it had tried or threatened to use the veto
in ways which most other nations thought violated the com-
promise finally agreed upon at San Francisco. The Soviet Union
had stood so staunchly for what it called the principle of great-
power unanamity—that is, for the right to veto—that trying to
persuade it to suddenly reverse its position seemed futile.

The immediate practical objective, as many Americans saw it,
was to remove the danger of surprise atomic attacks. They be-
lieved that we should put aside the question of punishment and
concentrate on setting up a foolproof system of detection—an In-
ternational Atomic Development Authority with adequate powers,
including inspection. They agreed that there could be no veto on
the operations of this Authority. Its duties and rights would have
to be set forth clearly in a treaty or convention. They would have
to be broad enough to give the world reasonable assurance that
secret preparations for atomic war would be promptly detected.
The treaty might well define violations of its terms, including
serious interference with the activities of the Authority, as acts
of an aggressive nature.

The question of the veto on punishment or preventive action
for violations would not arise unless or until the treaty had been
signed and the Authority had begun to operate. Then any major
violation would be a clear signal of intent to launch a war with

40

nm Us

r

QUESTION OF VETO

NATION IS DISCOVERED PRODUCING ATOM
BOMBS

WITH. VETO

NATION IS DISCOVERED PRODUCING ATOM
BOMBS

L

-

PENALTIES ARE IMPOSED AUTOMATICALLY
AND IMMEDIATELY

ONE OF THE BIG FIVE MAY VETO ANY
MOVE FOR PENALTY

AUTHORITY OF UN STRENGTHENED

EACH NATION TAKES ITS OWN ACTION.

UN POWER IMPAIRED

DANGERS

NATION ON THE PRETEXT OF ATOM VIOLA-

TION

SECURITY
COUNCIL

DELAY IN ACTION MAY GIVE ADVANTAGE
TO THE AGGRESSOR

GRAPHIC ASSOCIATES

atumic weapons. It would be a signal which other nations could
not ignore. Veto or no veto, they would have to act, and act
promptly, or risk annihilation.

Therefore, many felt, the question of the veto on punishment
was rather theoretical, and in any event did not need to be dealt
with at once. They feared that introducing the veto question
would befog the urgent, practical problem of setting up an In-
ternational Atomic Development Authority. What we want to
find out, they said, is whether all nations, including the Soviet
Union, can agree on such a system of control—let’s not put any
superfluous obstacles in the way of finding that out as soon as

possible.

BARUCH DOES NOT BUDGE

Mr. Baruch, however, held to his position. He insisted that every
foreseeable loophole should be closed. He wanted to leave no
basis for misunderstanding about the gravity of a violation of the
atomic treaty. Not only must no nation be permitted to block or
delay punishment or preventive action, but all other nations must
be pledged to act at once. The job of dealing with the aggressor
must not be left to a few. All who want peace must be bound to
do their part and do it immediately.

Mr. Baruch’s view was supported by straightforward logic.
(The same logic demands that the great power veto should be
completely dropped from the Charter.) But from a practical point
of view it can be argued that preparation to wage atomic war, in
violation of a treaty, would be an acutely dangerous form of
aggression.

Suppose one nation invaded another with ground troops. The
victim of this aggression might be overrun, but other nations
would have time to mobilize their forces and get ready to deal
with the aggressor. If, however, the aggressor had such weapons
as atomic bombs, he might be able to prevent those other nations

42

froin taking effective action. They might be intimidated, or devas-
tated, before they could mobilize their forces.

Since this is so, Mr. Baruch said, let’s face it squarely now. He
made it plain that he was asking that the veto on punishment or
preventive action be waived only in the case of violations of the
atomic treaty—violations which would be specified in the treaty
itself. He did not propose that the veto power in other situations
be curbed by amendment of the Charter or otherwise.

Mr. Baruch presented his plan—the official plan of the United
States—to the UN Atomic Energy Commission in New York on
June 14, 1946, the day it convened for its first meeting.

“We are here to make a choice between the quick and the
dead,” Mr. Baruch said. The United States, he said, “shares
ardently and hopefully” the longing of the peoples of the world
for peace and security. “The search of science for the absolute
weapon has reached fruition in this country. But she (the United
States) stands ready to proscribe and destroy this instrument—
to lift its use from death to life—if the world will join in a pact
to that end.”

GROMYKO PROPOSES A DIFFERENT PLAN

The only other proposals submitted to the UN Atomic Energy
Commission came from the Soviet Union. Andrei A. Gromyko,
the Soviet repres« tative, offered the draft of an agreement for-
bidding the production and use of atomic weapons. Within three
months after a majority of nations had ratified the agreement, all
stocks of atomic energy weapons, whether in finished or semi-
finished condition, were to be destroyed.

Mr. Gromyko proposed that the Commission immediately ap-
point two committees: one on the exchange of scientific informa-
tion and one on the prohibition of atomic weapons. He made
some obscure allusions to inspection and enforcement. His draft
treaty, however, contained no provisions for inspection or other

43

means of detecting violations. It suggested no controls on the
processes by which fissionable materials are produced—processes
which represent perhaps 80 per cent of the work of making an
atomic bomb. It provided no sanctions. Individual nations were
to punish violations occurring within their borders. Mr. Gromyko
stated that the Soviet Union would insist that the great power
veto be retained “under any circumstances.”

Although disappointing, the Soviet proposals were hardly sur-
prising. Since the Russians lacked atomic weapons, they would
naturally want them outlawed at once. Naturally, also, they
wanted access as soon as possible to all our scientific and techni-

cal knowledge.
c

OBJECTIONS TO THE GROMYKO PLAN
Mr. Gromyko’s proposal for a simple treaty or convention outlaw-
ing the production, possession, and use of atomic weapons had
partial precedents. There have been international agreements not
to use specific weapons. Some of these have been observed. The
convention barring the use of poisonous gases, adopted after the
First World War, is an example. But it did not prohibit nations
from making and possessing poisonous gases. The principal bel-
ligerents in World War II had their gases of various kinds and
were equipped to use them. But, quite apart from the co:uvention
which some of them had signed, each had practical reasons for
not using gas. The Germans and Japanese probably were deterred
by the fear of retaliation. If our side had used gas first, the Ger-
mans and the Japanese might have turned it on the Chinese and
Russians, who were not well-prepared to cope with it. There were
specific occasions when one side or the other would have found
gas useful—none when either side could win the war or obtain
a decisive advantage by employing it.

Gromyko’s plan, it should be noted, would prohibit not only the
use but the possession and manufacture of atomic weapons. Its
practical effect would be to disarm the United States atomically,

44

thus depriving us even of such security as there may be in the
ability to retaliate promptly.

Obviously there is no safety for us or the world in a treaty out-
lawing and abolishing atomic weapons unless there are ways of
making sure that the treaty is not violated secretly. If the United
States were to breach an agreement to cease making atomic
weapons, it would soon become known. Our people have freedom
of movement and of speech. Foreigners come and go from our
country. They can travel where they like and mingle freely with
our citizens. Congress has the power to inquire and to investi-
gate, as well as control over the pursestrings of our government.

If all nations were as wide open to informal inspection and ob-
servation as the United States is in time of peace, the secret pro-
duction of atomic weapons on a large scale would be difficult, if
not impossible. But parts of the world, notably the Soviet Union,
are walled off. We are permitted to know very little about what
goes on inside the Soviet Union. It would be relatively easy for
a nation so insulated to violate an atomic energy treaty without
being detected—until too late.

There was no necessary conflict, however, between the de-
clared purposes of the Soviet proposals and the American plan.
Our plan also called for the outlawing of atomic weapons and
full disclosure of information about the production and use of
atomic energy in peaceful ways. It offered the Russians what
they asked for—in due course—if they would agree to the safe-
guards to be applied to, and in behalf of, all nations alike.
Gromyko’s vague references to measures of control and to sanc-
tions encouraged the hope that the Soviet government would not
remain inflexibly opposed to an effective system of international
control.

THE UN COMMISSION GOES TO WORK
The UN Atomic Energy Commission buckled down to six months

of rather intensive work. It created a small Working Committee,

45

and other subcommittees on which each of the twelve nations
on the Commission—the members of the Security Council plus
Canada—was represented.

The American plan was explained and elaborated in a series
of memoranda and speeches. Most of the nations represented
endorsed it in principle.

Repeated efforts were made to probe the Soviet attitude. Mr.
Gromyko was, at times, ambiguous. At others, he seemed to be
inflexibly opposed to the American plan. He said on one occa-
sion: “The United States proposals in their present form cannot
be accepted in any way by the Soviet Union either as a whole or
in separate parts.” He clearly opposed any abridgement of the
great power veto. He seemed to object also to anything in the
nature of an Atomic Development Authority and a full system of
inspection.

Nevertheless, the Soviet Union continued to take part in the
various committee and subcommittee discussions.

THE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL REPORT

On October 2, 1946, the Scientific and Technical Committee sub-
mitted a very important report. Its central conclusion was this:
“We do not find any basis in the available scientific facts for
supposing that effective control is not technologically feasible.”
This was the unanimous verdict of the scientists and other ex-
perts appointed by the twelve nations to study the physical or
technical problems of international control. American experts, who
had the essential knowledge, had long ago reached this conclu-
sion. It was proper, however, that the scientists and technicians
of other nations should have a chance to make up their own
minds. Encouragingly, their verdict was concurred in by the
Soviet member of the Scientific and Technical Committee. He
said, however, that since the information supplied was incom-
plete, the conclusions of the report were “hypothetical.”

46

HOW URANIUM IS USED

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MINING AND
REFINING

PLANT TO SEPARATE ATOMIC PILE
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GAK RIDGE U235 PLUTONIUM HANFORD

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SECONDARY
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POWER RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS

GRAPHIC ASSOCIATES

Having decided that effective safeguards were technically
feasible, this Committee was asked to work them out. Again it
had the help of elaborate studies already made by the American
experts. And again the scientists and technicians of other nations
had the opportunity to study the facts and make up their own
minds. After two more months of hard work, they drafted their
report. It is an 89-page document, much too detailed to sum-
martize here. But in general it follows the reasoning of the Ache-
son-Lilienthal report and the Baruch proposals: for safety, the
more “dangerous” operations in producing atomic energy would
have to be placed directly in the hands of an international Au-
thority, and this Authority also would need far-reaching powers
of inspection.

This report stressed one point which had been recognized in
earlier studies but not stated with such emphasis before: that at
each stage in the production of atomic energy, secret violations
would tend to become harder to discover. It would be “almost
impossible” to detect the clandestine manufacture of atomic
bombs, if the fissionable material to put into them were available.
It was therefore absolutely necessary to make sure that there
were no unauthorized accumulations of nuclear fuels anywhere
along the line.

The Soviet scientific representative took part in the discussions
but did not join the majority in final approval of the report.

THE RUSSIANS TAKE A NEW TACK

On October 29, the Soviet Foreign Minister, V. M. Molotov,
scorchingly attacked the American atomic energy plan in a speech
before the UN General Assembly, then meeting at Flushing
Meadows. He also belittled the military importance of atomic
weapons. For good measure, he included a violent personal attack
on Mr. Baruch. At the same time, he introduced a resolution call-
ing for a general reduction in armaments, including the banning

48

of the production and use of atomic energy for military pur-
poses.

Four weeks later, however, Mr. Molotov made another speech
to the General Assembly in very different tone. He spoke of
atomic energy as an “extremely serious” matter. He agreed that
“strong international control is needed.” (The phrase had been
used a few weeks earlier by Stalin in answering questions sub-
mitted by a newspaper correspondent.) He agreed also that “spe-
cial organs of inspection” should be formed to back up controls
on armaments.

On December 4, Mr. Molotov spoke again in this vein. This
time he also discussed the veto. He said that of course the veto
could not be used to prevent control, including inspection, from
being carried out, once the plan had been agreed to.

These changes in expressed attitude appeared to bring the
Soviet Union within negotiating range of the American plan, ex-
cept on the question of the veto on punishment. This was en-
couraging.

IS ARTICLE 51 ENOUGHP

Article 51 of the UN Charter offered a possible way around the
veto problem. It says: “Nothing in the present Charter shall im-
pair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if
an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations,
until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security.” The proposed atomic
treaty might define major violations as “armed attacks.” Then,
it was suggested, members of the United Nations would be legally
free to take prompt preventive action, even if the hands of the
Security Council were tied by a big power veto.

Mr. Baruch himself had taken note of Article 51. It was referred
to in the outline plan adopted by the UN Atomic Energy Com-
mission. However, Mr. Baruch considered this a weak alternative

49

to his direct approach. Article 51 had been inserted in the Charter
as a kind of backstop, to make it plain that a nation which was
directly attacked did not have to wait on approval of the Se-
curity Council before it resorted to arms in self-defense and that
other nations could legally come at once to its aid. It did not,
however, require other nations to aid a victim of overt aggression
or to join in preventive measures against a threatened act of
aggression.

Later, another line of legal reasoning was thrown out inform-
ally by Mr. Austin, among others. This was that aggression by a
great power having a veto on the Security Council would amount
to “nullification.” Other nations would then have not only the
right, but the solemn obligation, to defend the Charter. This was
an extension of the thinking which had led Secretary Byrnes to
say many months earlier that the United States would defend
“the principles and purposes of the Charter.” He meant that the
right of veto on the Security Council could not be used to shield
aggression; that it did not relieve a great power of its obligation
to abide by the principles of the Charter; and that the United
States would not be stopped by a veto from organizing collective
action agains! a great power which broke or threatened the

peace.

THE COMMISSION APPROVES THE AMERICAN PLAN

On December 30, 1946, the UN Atomic Energy Commission ap-
proved an outline plan for the international control of atomic
energy. This plan was based squarely on the proposals originally
presented by the United States on June 14. A few refinements
were added as a result of the months of discussion, but no im-
portant part of the American plan was left out or watered down.
The Soviet Union and Poland refrained from voting. All the other
ten members of the Commission approved the plan, although
some indicated that they wouid consider compromises on the

50

the

question of a veto on punishment if agreement could be reached
on the rest of the plan.

From the Commission, the plan went to the Security Council.
At this point Mr. Baruch and his associates resigned, on the
ground that the problem should now be handled by the regular
United States representative on the Security Council, Mr. Austin.
Meanwhile the proposal for atomic energy control had become

entangled with the question of general disarmament.

SHOULD ALL ARMS BE CUT?

The United States traditionally has favored disarmament. But
Mr. Molotov’s proposal for a general reduction in armaments was
regarded with misgiving by American officials and representatives
of various other nations. This was because they had serious
doubts that the Kremlin really wanted to live in friendship with
the western democracies.

The controlled Russian press and radio had been pouring forth
propaganda hostile to the democracies. The Soviet government
had failed to live up to our understanding of some of the pledges
it had made at Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam. It had adopted what
Under Secretary of State Acheson described a little later as an
“aggressive and expanding” policy.

There were differences of opinion in the United States and
elsewhere as to the purposes of these Soviet tactics. But, apart
from the Communists and their fellow-travelers, there were few
in this country who any longer regarded these tactics with ap-
proval or complacency.

But, some people asked, wasn’t Molotov’s demand for a general
reduction of armaments a sign that the rulers of the Kremlin
really wanted peace? The Russians obviously were not prepared
to wage another great war. They had hardly begun to repair the
damage they suffered in World War II. Industrially they were
not a match for the western democracies. They had no atomic

51

bombs. There could be a vast gulf, however, between not wanting
another great war just now and being willing to cooperate with
other nations in organizing and maintaining peace on the basis
of the principles of the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations.

Let’s examine how a general reduction in armaments would,
or might, affect the relative military strength of the Soviet Union
and the United States.

The Russians’ military strength consists chiefly of large num-
bers of ground troops using relatively simple weapons. They have
no long-range air force, almost no navy excepting some sub-
marines, no atomic bombs, and very few other advanced weapons.
A reduction in Soviet arms could not mean much more than the
demobilization of foot soldiers. These could quickly be remobil-
ized or trained afresh, and the weapons to arm them could also
be made quickly.

We and the British, on the other hand, rely heavily on intricate,
long-range weapons. These enable us to bring our power to bear
at distant points, across the oceans and through the skies. As these
weapons were outlawed or reduced, by agreement or by our
own action, our ability to intervene across the oceans would
shrink. Once destroyed or laid aside, they could not be built anew
suddenly, and men could not be trained quickly to use them.

Thus a general reduction of armaments would impair our
military strength much more than the Soviet Union’s. It would
result in increasing Soviet military strength, relative to ours,
throughout Europe and Asia. This trend would be accelerated if
priority were given to limiting weapons of “mass destruction.”
This phrase, carried forward from the Three-Nation Agreed
Declaration, was in the resolution on general arms reduction
finally adopted by the General Assembly in December. It was not
defined. But it might be construed to mean long-range aircraft,
and many other advanced weapons of war, in addition to atomic
bombs and bacteria.

52

v™

The Russians would feel more comfortable, of course, if the
weapons which they lack and against which they have poor de-
fenses were destroyed or limited. Conceivably, if we disarmed
they would stop trying to expand, concentrate on their internal
affairs, and become good neighbors. But we could not be sure of
that, and the evidence to the contrary had been mounting. There
was not enough strength in Europe, Asia, or the British system to
check Soviet expansion. Repeatedly the Russians had indicated
that the only thing that made them stop or hesitate was fear of
the armed power of the United States. Mr. Molotov’s arms reduc-
tion plan seemed well-designed to clear away the most formidable
obstacle to Soviet-Communist domination of Eurasia.

Disarmament, however, is a word with magical appeal to all
who yearn for peace. Also, armaments are financially burden-
some. There were popular pressures in the United States and
Britain—and almost certainly in the Soviet Union also—to reduce
this burden. Suspicious as it might be of Mr. Molotov’s motives.
no government could morally or politically refuse to explore the
disarmament question.

WE PREFER ATOMIC SAFEGUARDS

If it would be a mistake—possibly a catastrophic blunder—for
the United States to disarm further before a satisfactory peace is
more Clearly assured, then why did we insist on pushing a plan
that would deprive us of by far our most potent weapon, the
atomic bomb?

Part of the answer is that we knew we would lose our mono-
poly in atomic weapons in a few years. Seeking security, we
offered to give up these weapons in return for safeguards against
surprise atomic attack.

Another part of the answer is that without international safe-
guards against the secret production of atomic weapons, the use
of this vast source of energy for constructive purposes would be

53

retarded. We would not feel safe in publishing information about
new and improved processes and applications. Some other na-
tions probably would try to keep their discoveries secret. Science
and technology flourish only when there is a free interchange,
when the specialists know what others in their field are finding
and thinking. Moreover, until the danger of being struck by sur-
prise with atomic weapons is removed, we probably will think it
prudent to put aside for our own atomic armory a considerable
part of the fissionable materials we produce. And other nations,
as they begin to manufacture fissionable materials, probably will
feel the same compulsion.

A third part of the answer is that we regarded the plan for in-
ternational control of atomic energy as a critical and revealing
test. An Atomic Development Authority with the necessary
powers, including full rights of inspection, would be a radical
step for all nations. In one way, however, it would be an espe-
cially radical step for the Soviet government because inspection
would breach the “iron curtain.” The rest of the world would
learn more about what goes on inside Russia, and the Russian
people would get more accurate information from the outside.

Such intercourse between the Russians and other peoples might
weaken the grip of the Communist dictatorship. For that reason
many observers of the Soviet system doubted that the Communist
Politbureau would ever take such a chance.

Perhaps this diagnosis was wrong, however. Perhaps the Soviet
government would agree to effective international control of
atomic energy. There was only one way to find out. That was to
go ahead and write a detailed atomic treaty and then, if it was
ratified, proceed step by step to put it into effect. Cooperation
between the Russians and the democracies in this novel and
difficult enterprise would be an augury of peace. It would set an
example and create a favorable atmosphere for other forms of

close cooperation.

54

If, on the other hand, the Kremlin was unalterably opposed
to effective international control of atomic energy, the sooner we
and other nations knew it, the better. We would have to make
other plans accordingly. And these plans could not take for
granted that the world was on the road to peace.

GROMYKO RENEWS THE ATTACK

The official United States response to Mr. Molotov’s proposal was
to endorse general arms reduction in principle but to insist that
the Security Council give (1) first consideration to the report of
the UN Atomic Energy Commission and (2) proper attention to
effective safeguards against violations of conventions limiting or
abolishing other weapons.

An arms reduction resolution was passed by the Assembly on
December 14. It was a compromise developed from the proposals
made by the Soviet Union, the United States, Canada, Australia,
and others. It was not a definite plan for reducing armaments
generally or any specific type of weapon. It merely called on the
Security Council to work out such a plan or plans.

in the Security Council, the United States continued to insist
that the plan of the UN Atomic Energy Commission be given
prior and separate consideration. The discussions on the Security
Council finally evoked from Mr. Gromyko an up-to-date state-
ment of the Soviet position on atomic energy.

Addressing the Security Council on March 5, Mr. Gromyko de-
manded:

(1) An immediate convention outlawing atomic weapons,
without waiting for agreement on measures of control and
punishment.

(2) No curbing of the veto—punishment to be left for the
Security Council to determine.

(3) Only limited powers of operation and inspection for an
Atomic Development Authority.

He said that “only people who have lost the sense of reality”
could believe that an Authority of the scope recommended by
the UN Atomic Energy Commission could possibly be accepted.
He said, in effect, that the Soviet Union would insist on retaining
the right to produce and use atomic energy and that it would
not permit all of these operations to be inspected by an interna-
tional Authority.

As in previous Soviet utterances on the subject, Mr. Gromyko
left some room for compromise. But he did nct leave enough to
make possible an effective system of international control. He
made it plain that the question of the veto on punishment was
not the only barrier to an agreement. The Soviet Union re-
mained opposed to the practical substance of the Commission’s
plan: international management of all dangerous phases of atomic

energy production combined with full inspection.

WHAT NEXT?

As matters now stand, the Soviet Union is the barrier to interna-
tional control of atomic energy. The indications are that all other
nations, except those whose governments are controlled by the
Soviet Union, would accept a plan patterned on the recommenda-
tions of the UN Atomic Energy Commission. There would be
arguments over details—indeed, many of the details would be
very difficult to work out—but this would not prevent agreement.
An international atomic treaty that was less than world-wide
would not, however, serve its main purpose: removal of the
danger of sudden aggression with secretly manufactured atomic
weapons. Yet without a major change in Russia’s attitude, there
‘an be no world-wide treaty.

The United States continues to manufacture atomic weapons,
or at least to stockpile fissionable materials which may be used
in atomic weapons. Mr. Baruch urged that this be done, pending
a satisfactory international agreement on atomic energy. There

56

CHOICES BEFORE US

WE CAN SURVIVE sy atomic CONQUEST OF THE WORLD WHILE WE STILL HAVE
A MONOPOLY OF THE BOMB

GRAPHIC ASSOCIATES

is unanimous agreement among responsible officials in the Execu-
tive branch and leaders cf both parties in Congress that this is
the only relatively safe course to follow. The governments of
many other nations are known to concur in this view. They do
not fear atomic aggression by the United States. They believe
that our possession of atomic weapons is a powerful check on
aggression by others. They would be discouraged if we destroved
our stockpile of atomic weapons or stopped making them before
we had a big supply on hand.

In time, however, other nations will be able to make atomic
weapons. Canada and Great Britain probably could be the first,
if they wished to pay the price in financial investment and in-
dustrial effort. They know the most about the methods. Other
nations also have the scientists, the engineers, and the industrial
capacity and techniques—or access to them—with which to pro-
duce atomic energy.

How long it would take the Soviet Union, starting from scratch,
to produce atomic energy in substantial quantities is a matter
of conjecture. Estimates run from 3 to 25 years. Generally, the
scientists estimate only a few years; engineers and industrialists
a somewhat longer period. The former know how widespread the
basic knowledge is; the latter are sharply aware of the difficulty
of designing and making some of the intricate and precise equip-
ment that is needed. Some technicians say that it will take the
Russians a very long time unless they can get help from the more
advanced industries of such countries as Germany, Sweden,
Switzerland, Britain, and the United States.

It is generally agreed, however, that another nation, starting
from scratch, could save a great deal of the money and effort we
put into the Manhattan project. We built plants for various
alternative processes. Another nation could stick to one process.
Probably it could devise some short-cuts and other improvements.

Our engineers and scientists have done so already since V-] Day.

58

If we kept on putting enough into research and development,
probably we could keep ahead in an atomic arms race. But we
cant be sure of that. Moreover, even if we had the most and
most powerful atomic weapons, we might be wiped out or crip-
pled if another nation with inferior atomic weapons, but enough
of them, struck first.

ARE THERE ANY ALTERNATIVES?

When a potential enemy arms itself with atomic weapons, our
only security may lie in widely dispersed and thoroughly pro-
tected stockpiles of atomic weapons and of the planes, rockets,
or other means of delivering atomic counterattacks. In this way
we might be able to retaliate, even if many of our cities were
wiped out in the first atomic onslaught. Our ability to strike back
might dissuade another nation from attacking with atomic
weapons. It is conceivable that if two or more antagonistic na-
tions were well armed with atomic weapons, the fear of retalia-
tion would keep them from going to war or from using atomic
weapons if they went to war. This might be a deterrent to ag-
gression. But it might also be a deterrent to collective action to
restrain an aggressor.

Reliance on these assumptions would give us little comfort.
They would not relieve our fear of sudden obliteration.

One alternative would be to prevent a potential enemy from
building up a supply of atomic weapons. Under the UN Atomic
Energy Commission plan, a major violation of the atomic treaty
would be treated as a threat or act of aggression. The nations
which want effective international control might decide to regard
refusal to accept such a system as evidence of intent to commit
aggression. Having agreed upon a treaty they might set a dead-
line for its acceptance by all nations. Some such terrible decision
may have to be faced it two or three years pass without voluntary

world-wide agreement on eftective control of atomic energy.

09

Before that time, the relations between the Soviet world and
the non-Soviet world may be more or less clarified. However, any
arrangements, no matter how satisfactory otherwise, which left
the Soviet Union or any other nation behind a closed wall, free
to arm itself in secret with atomic and other weapons, would not
solve the crucial atomic problem. Moreover, prolonged delay
in setting up effective international control would delay also the

harnessing of atomic energy for constructive purposes.

CAN THE CHARTER BE CHANGED?

April 25, 1945, the day on which Secretary Stimson presented his
memorandum on atomic energy to President Truman, was the
day on which the United Nations Conference on International
Organization convened in San Francisco. It is interesting, if use-
less, to wonder whether the Charter would have been drawn
differently if all the delegates had known and believed what Mr.
Stimson and General Groves told the President about “the most
terrible weapon ever known in human history.”

Some of the United States, British, and Canadian delegates
knew of the atomic project and that it was nearing its wartime
goal. Their knowledge may have influenced their thinking some-
what, at least to the extent of reinforcing their determination to
form an international organization to keep the peace.

Such evidence as there is, however, argues against the theory
that the delegates would have agreed on a tighter-knit Charter
if they had realized what the scientists and technicians were
about to unleash. Even without the atomic bomb, warfare had
already become terrible and destructive enough to provide com-
pelling reasons for going as far as possible to make the United
Nations an organization capable of preventing another great war.

Most of the smaller nations favored a tighter charter—one
which at least left less leeway for a great power veto.

In our own country, most pre-war isolationists had become

60

advocates of a United Nations organization. Some of them had
inklings of the secret developments in bacteriological and atomic
warfare. But the growth of long-range aviation and the appear-
ance of such weapons as the German V-2 rockets had already
made them realize that if some nation set out in the future to
conquer the world it might strike the United States first. It was
evident that World War II might be the last in which the United
States would either have time to get ready to fight or be rela-
tively safe from direct and perhaps devastating bombardment.

At San Francisco neither the Soviet Union nor the United
States was willing to give up the great power veto. If the Amer-
ican people had known beforehand of the atomic bomb and what
it could do, they might have put pressure on their representatives
to abolish or more severely restrict the veto. It does not follow
that the Soviet Union would have agreed to this. Subsequent
revelation of what atomic energy could do in war and might do
in peace has had no appreciable effect on the Russian attitude.
The Soviet government has stood stoutly for the widest interpre-
tation of its veto right and has repeatedly given notice that it
will not waive this right even for the special purposes of an
atomic energy pact. The United States has proposed to forego
the veto only for the purposes of atomic energy control.

IS WORLD GOVERNMENT THE ANSWER?
So long as the great powers hold to this view, revision of the
Charter to curb or eliminate the veto is an academic question.
There is even less chance, at the present time, of a world-wide
agreement on a World Government. Discussion of both these
alternatives—gradual amendment of the Charter and radical
amendment—is useful, however, in stimulating thought and
mobilizing opinion here and in other nations where the discussion
can be carried on.

In this connection, it should be noted that world-wide adop-

6]

tion of the plan approved by the UN Atomic Energy Commission
would be a concrete step in the direction of world government.
It would require the cession of important sovereign rights to an
international agency. The Atomic Development Authority would
be much more than an inspection service. It would conduct all
dangerous operations in making and using atomic energy
throughout the world. It would own and operate mines, build
and operate plants, issue licenses for various applications of
atomic energy within nations, and conduct its own research
laboratories. It would be responsible only to the United Nations.
Any government which seriously interfered with the operations
of the Authority or otherwise violated the atomic treaty would
become liable to immediate punishment.

It has been suggested also that the atomic treaty should make
individuals as well as governments subject to punishment. The
Nuremburg trials established a precedent for punishing indi-
viduals for acts of aggression. The Atomic Energy Authority
probably would also need powers to discipline its own employees.
It is conceivable, in addition, that individuals not connected
with any government or the Atomic Development Authority could
produce atomic energy in secret. The atomic energy treaty might
make such individuals subject to punishment by an international
tribunal. It is unlikely, however, that serious violations could
occur without the connivance, if not the overt acts, of a national
government. Even if punishment were meted out later to the
leaders of this government, they probably could not be brought
to the bar without prompt collective military action.

If the Atomic Development Authority were a success, it prob-
ably would encourage national governments to yield other sov-
ereign rights for specific purposes. Thus, project by project, an
advance might be made toward world government, even without
general revision of the UN Charter.

Some advocates of world government want to begin with the

62

nations that are willing to join in such an experiment now. Until
such an organization became world-wide it would not be
a world government. This general approach, however, might
have some practical advantages unless progress is made in the
near future toward bridging the gap between the Soviet and
non-Soviet parts of the world. If enough nations were willing to
try it, it might even hasten the bridging of the gap. Still, it is
difficult to see how western democracy and communism could
be fused in a world government. One concept of society or the
other would have to give way or radically change.

Atomic energy offers no clearcut answer to these great prob-
lems. But it warns that the penalty for failing to solve them may
be the destruction of civilization, if not the obliteration of man-
kind. And its vast potentiality for lightening the daily burdens
and improving the standard of living of the human race offers a

special bonus for hastening their solution.

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and not of the Association.

The Headline Series .. .
tries to give its readers enough unbiased background infor-
mation in understandable form so they can make up their
own minds intelligently on the great international questions
of the day. The articles are prepared under the supervision
of the Association’s Department of Popular Education with
the cooperation of the FPA research staff of experts.

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obtained from:

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The Headline Series for August

SWORDS of PEACE

National Disarmament &

an International Police

Preston Slosson & Grayson Kirk